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Beyond the predictable: 
demographic changes in the EU up to 2050 
The European Union has had a number of demographic surprises over the last 30 years. Fertility levels 
have dropped dramatically, life expectancy has continued to increase strongly and most Member States 
of the EU have become immigration countries. Consequently, the number of young people has declined 
significantly (by around 20%), whereas both those of working age and the elderly continued to grow in 
number. 
What might happen in the next 50 years? Will the EU soon be confronted with a shrinking working age 
population? Will the under-20s be outnumbered by the over-60s? What can we say about the future 
demographic differences between EU countries ? 
These and other questions are answered in this bulletin. Based upon five different but internationally 
consistent long-term population scenarios, a dozen principal future demographic trends are presented. A 
summary table concerning the key-assumptions of the scenarios can be found in the middle of this 
publication; a brief technical explanation is given at the end. 
The EU's share in world population will 
continue to diminish 
With its 373 million inhabitants on 1 January 1996, 
the European Union is the third largest world demo-
graphic power after China (1.204 billion) and India 
(944 million). It is ahead of the United States (264 mil-
lion). 
However, the EU's share in world population is dimin-
ishing. In 1950 the EU embraced almost 12% of 
mankind. Currently that figure is less than 7%, and if 
current fertility, mortality and international migration 
trends persist (baseline scenario), by the year 2050 
no more than 4% will live in the EU (Figure 1). Even 
if fertility recovers and net migration returns to some-
what higher levels than actually observed (high sce-
nario), this proportion will further decline. 
Figure 1 
EU population as a % of total world population 
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Towards a shrinking population? 
Figure 2 demonstrates that sooner or later total EU 
population will stagnate and decline. According to the 
low scenario, 'depopulation' will already occur within ten 
years, and by the year 2050 the total number of inhabi­
tants will be very close to that observed in 1950. 
The baseline scenario expects a population to peak 
around 2025, and a total population in 2050 close to the 
current one. Only the high scenario foresees a continu­
ous increase over the next five decades, resulting ir, an 
EU population of 444 million in 2050. This is 20% more 
than the current population. 
Within the Union, future population growth will be farfrom 
uniform. According to the baseline scenario, Italy will be 
already confronted with a population decline within 12 
years, whilst both Luxembourg and Sweden will escape 
this experience (Figure 3). 
Figure 2 
Total population - EUR 15 
250 
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Deaths will outnumber births 
The principal reason why the EU population will start to 
decline is the 'births deficit' of postwar generations. 
People born after 1945 have or are expected to have too 
few children to replace themselves. Therefore, sooner or 
later the number of deaths will start to exceed the number 
of live births (Figure 4). 
If fertility levels continue to decrease (low scenario), this 
demographic break-even point will already have been 
reached in 1997. If fertility recovers considerably, to 
levels of about 1.95 children per woman (high scenario), 
natural population loss will not appear in the next 3-4 
decades. 
Several EU countries have already experienced natural 
decrease. Germany has been confronted with such a 
situation continuously since 1972. Currently Italy, too, is 
losing population through natural decrease. 
In the short and medium term all the southern Member 
States will probably follow, as will Austria and Denmark. 
In the long run all other EU countries will face natural 
population decline. 
Figure 4 
Live births minus deaths - EUR 15 
millions 
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Migration will continue to play a major role 
Since the mid-1980s international migration has rapidly 
gained importance as a component of population growth. 
During the period 1990-1994, net migration (immigrants 
less emigrants) to the EU amounted to well over 5 million 
people. The contribution of migration to population 
growth rose to around 70%. 
In all scenarios it is expected that Europe will remain an 
attractive region for immigrants. Basically depending on 
economic developments and migration policies, net mi­
gration will in the medium and long run vary between 400 
and 800 thousand persons a year {Figure 5). 
Due to diminishing economic disparities and the intro­
duction of some kind of burden sharing for asylum seek­
ers, the southern Member States will probably get a 
larger proportion of the total inflow. However, Germany 
will continue to be the most popular immigration country 
(Table 3). 
Figure 5 
Net migration1 - EUR 15 
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For the period 1950-1994 calculated as total population growth 
minus live births plus deaths 
Decline in total fertility will stop 
During the last 30 years the EU reproductive patterns 
changed considerably. A fast and still-growing propor-
tion of women had few children and postponed mother-
hood. As a result the total fertility rate, which is affected 
by both the number and timing of births, has declined 
sharply to historically low levels of around 1.45 children 
per woman (Figure 6). 
This trend will soon come to an end. If the vast majority 
of women born during the 1960s and 1970s are able to 
realise their family ambitions and therefore catch up 
rapidly with postponed births (high scenario), the total 
fertility rate could rapidly rise to levels very close to the 
observed average family size of women born in the early 
1950s: 1.95 children per woman. 
If these generations never catch up, and consequently 
around 30% of the women remain childless (low sce-
nario), the total fertility rate will hardly change at all. 
In all scenarios it is assumed that current international 
fertility differences will persist. Therefore, in the long run 
the highest total fertility rates are expected in Finland, 
France, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom, and the 
lowest in Germany, Italy and Spain (Table 3). 
Figure 6 
Total fertility rate - EUR 15 
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Life expectancy will continue to increase; gender 
gap might diminish somewhat 
Since 1945 life expectancy at birth in the EU has in-
creased almost continuously. The total gain amounts to 
well over 10 years. Based on the recently observed 
mortality rates, women and men are expected to live on 
average 80 and 73.5 years respectively {Figure 7). 
During the next 50 years a further fairly substantial 
increase in longevity might occur. If medicines, preven-
tive and curative health services, healthy life-styles, etc. 
continue to improve (high scenario), life expectancy at 
birth for women might reach around 87 years in 2050. 
For men maximum levels of around 83 years seem 
plausible, so that the gender gap might diminish some-
what. 
However, if the further development of positive influ-
ences on mortality slows down shortly and is increasingly 
counteracted by negative influences such as cigarette-
smoking and stress, progress in life expectancy could 
start to stagnate and the gender gap would then not 
narrow (low scenario). 
Current differences between countries in life expectan-
cies are assumed to remain stable (low scenario) or to 
narrow somewhat (baseline and high scenarios). So, 
Sweden and France (females only) continue to be the 
EU countries with the highest life expectancies, whereas 
the lowest levels are expected in Denmark, Ireland, 
Portugal and Finland (males only) (Table 3). 
Figure 7 
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Fewer young people? 
During the period 1975­1995 the number of people aged 
under 20 within the EU dropped from 110 million to 
90 million (Figure 8) . 
If current low fertility levels persist, a further reduction will 
take place. In this case, in 2050 the Union will comprise 
no more than 52 million young people. However, if fertility 
catches up strongly, the number of young people in the 
EU could steadily rise to a level of almost 100 million in 
2020. 
The share of the young in the total population, currently 
24%, will certainly continue to decline up to the year 2000 
(Table 2). Thereafter, this process of 'dejuvenation' 
might stop. By 2050 the proportion of young people could 
lie between 16 and 24%. 
According to the baseline scenario almost all EU coun­
tries will lose young people during the period 1995­2020 
(Figure 9). Ireland in particular will be confronted with a 
steep decline. Luxembourg, on the other hand, seems 
to escape any further decline. 
The Irish population is currently by far the youngest of 
the Union (34%), whereas Germany and Italy are the 
most dejuvenated countries (21%). In the coming dec­
ades this difference will certainly diminish. By the year 
2050, Finland, Ireland and Sweden could be the young­
est countries (18­26%), and Italy and Spain the most 
dejuvenated (14­22%). 
Figure 8 
Population aged under 20 ­ EUR 15 
Figure 9 
Population aged under 20: change 1995­2020 (%) 
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Table 3: Key-assumptions used for long-term population scenarios 
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The working age population will sooner or later de­
cline 
For decades the Union possessed a strongly increasing 
working age population (Figure 10). Since the mid 1970's 
average growth has amounted almost 1.5 million people 
a year. 
In the near future this growth will slow down. Heavily 
depending on the net inflow of migrants, the average 
annual increase will drop to levels between 0.2 and 0.6 
million people. 
Immediately after 2005, when the first, large postwar 
'baby­boom' generations are leaving the working­age 
population, a fairly long period of decline will start. A 
stabilisation may take place around 2035, but only if 
fertility recovers structurally and net migration continues 
at rather high levels. 
Within the Union probably all countries except Luxem­
bourg will sooner or later be affected by this new demo­
graphic trend (Figure 11). Italy in particular might very 
soon be confronted with a sharply declining potential 
labour force. 
Figure 10 
Population aged 20­59 EUR 15 
Figure 11 
Population aged 20­59: change 1995­2020 (%) 
[m 
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Ageing will accelerate 
Apart from a short period of stagnation at the end of the 
1970s, the EU population aged 60 and over has in­
creased continuously since 1950 (Figure 12). Currently 
the annual growth of the elderly population fluctuates 
around a level of 0.8 million persons, or 1%. 
Up to 2005 this growth rate will hardly change. However, 
as soon as the 'baby­boomers' start to enter this age 
group, the annual increase will shift to levels of around 
1.1 million people. This will remain the case until the less 
numerous 'baby­bust' generations born in the early 
1970s pass the age of 60. 
The ever­increasing share of the elderly in the total EU 
population will also accelerate during the period 2005­
2030. From 21% now and 22% in 2005, it is expected to 
rise to a level of around 27% in the year 2020 (Table 5). 
By 2050 the proportion might lie between 27­40%. 
In all EU countries the number of old people will increase 
considerably (Figure 13). Particularly in the currently 
least aged Member States of the Union, Finland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Netherlands, the elderly population will 
grow rapidly. However, by 2050 Italy and Spain are 
expected to be the most aged EU countries (30­44%). 
Figure 12 
Population aged 60 and over ­ EUR 15 
Figure 13 
Population aged 60 and over: increase 1995­2020 (%) 
millions 
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Both the working age and the elderly population 
will become older 
During the next 20 years the age structure of the EU 
population aged 20-59 will change dramatically (Fi­
gure 14). At present about 45% of the working age 
population is more than 40 years old. By 2015 this 
proportion will reach levels of around 55%. Naturally, this 
trend is mainly due to the ageing of the large postwar 
baby-boom generations. 
Figure 14 
Population aged 40-59 as a % of population aged 
20-59-EUR 15 
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year 
Figure 15 
Population aged 80 and over as a % of population 
aged 60 and over - EUR 15 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
year 
All Member States will sooner or later experience these 
more specific ageing trends. Particularly Italy, Portugal 
and Spain might be confronted with a relatively long 
period of an ageing potential labour force, whereas 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden are already in the middle 
of this process. The long-term ageing of the elderly 
population will be fairly steep and strong in Italy and the 
Netherlands (Figure 16). 
After 2015 the ageing of the potential labour force will 
stagnate and probably even reverse as the less numer­
ous generations born in the 1970s are reaching the age 
of 40, while the baby-boomers are leaving the working-
age population. 
Also the EU population aged 60 and over will become 
older. After the turn of the century the share of the 
population aged 80 and over in the elderly population will 
increase almost continuously (Figure 15). Particularly 
after 2025, when the baby-boomers are passing the age 
of 80, the number of the 'very old' will rise dramatically. 
By the year 2050 their share of the elderly population 
might be more than one-third. 
Figure 16 
Population aged 80 and over as a % of population 
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Age dependency will rise drastically 
Figure 17 shows the observed and projected total age 
dependency ratio, i.e. the sum of the number of people 
aged 0­19 and 60+ expressed as a percentage of the 
population aged 20­59. For the Union as a whole this 
indicator has decreased since mid 1970s from 100% to 
80%, due to the sharply declining number of young 
people. 
In the next ten years the ratio will be fairly constant but 
thereafter a steady and perhaps even strong increase 
might occur. Especially if current low fertility levels per­
sist and life expectancy structurally rises (old scenario), 
the age dependency will in the long run climb to all­time 
high levels of well above 120%. 
Figure 78 demonstrates that during the next 25 years the 
increase in total age dependency will be far from uniform 
within the Union. The ratio will hardly grow in Portugal 
and Spain, whilst Finland and the Netherlands will prob­
ably have to cope with an increase well above the 
European average. 
However, by the year 2050 Italy (107­136%) and Spain 
(110­138%) are expected to be the EU countries with the 
highest age dependency (Table 6). 
Figure 17 
Age dependency ratio ­ EUR 15 
Figure 18 
Age dependency ratio: increase 1995­2020 (%) 
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Eurostat s new long-term population scenarios - technical explanation 
National population projections by sex and age are produced by the National Statistical Institutes (regularly and 
irregularly), United Nations (every 2 years) and Eurostat (every 3-5 years). 
The first two agencies basically aim to make population forecasts or the 'best guess' for the next 10-15 years, 
usually supplemented with uncertainty variants. Eurostat produces various population scenarios for the next 5-6 
decades, which attempt to explore realistic boundaries of demographic change in the long run. 
The new long-term population scenarios of Eurostat, compiled in 1996 with the assistance of Statistics 
Netherlands, concern the 18 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA). The scenarios cover the period 
1995-2050 and project the population at 1 January by sex and single years of age up to the age group of 90+. 
Five scenarios were prepared: baseline, low, high, young and old. 
The low and high scenario can be considered as plausible extremes with respect to population growth. The low 
scenario describes a demographic future in which current fertility levels of around 1.45 children per woman will 
persist, life expectancies will hardly increase and total net immigration for the EEA will drop from 600,000 to 
400,000 persons a year. The high scenario assumes a recovery of fertility to levels of around 1.95 children per 
woman, life expectancies continuing to increase strongly in all countries and total net inflow of migrants increasing 
to a level of 800,000 persons a year. 
The young and old scenarios can be interpreted as plausible extremes with respect to population ageing. In the 
young scenario, high fertility and high net immigration assumptions are combined with low life expectancies, 
whereas in the old scenario high life expectancies are combined with low fertility and low net immigration. 
The baseline scenario describes the 'average development' and can therefore be used as a reference. This 
scenario is generally fairly close to the latest population forecasts made by the national statistical institutes. 
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